The Economic Journal · 2025 · Fabrizio Colella、Keith E. Maskus、Alessandro Peri
中文摘要
离岸金融避风港更严格的洗钱监管可能会在无意中增强国内洗钱的动机。本研究利用针对加勒比司法管辖区金融型洗钱活动的监管规定，考察其对美国各县设立空壳公司及其他洗钱行为的影响。理论上对其效应的预测并不明确：更严格的监管既可能通过替代效应增加国内洗钱，也可能通过破坏洗钱网络而减少国内洗钱。我们发现了支持替代效应的有力证据：此前与这些司法管辖区存在金融联系（金融敞口）的县，在监管收紧后商业活动有所增加。这一效应在洗钱高风险行业中更为显著，同时相关企业雇用的工人更少，并虚增营业收入。存在金融敞口的县还出现了现金交易占比和估值错误的房地产交易占比上升。本研究首次为外国洗钱监管在实体经济和金融层面产生的意外影响提供了间接证据。
Abstract
Abstract Tighter money-laundering regulations in offshore financial havens may inadvertently spur incentives to launder money domestically. Our study exploits regulations targeting financially based money laundering in Caribbean jurisdictions to examine their impact on the creation of front companies and other money-laundering practices in US counties. Predictions on the effects are ambiguous: stricter regulations could either increase domestic money laundering through substitution or decrease it by disrupting laundering networks. We find strong evidence of substitution. Counties with prior financial exposure to these jurisdictions experience a rise in business activities after regulatory tightening. The effect is greater in sectors at high risk of money laundering, while firms hire fewer workers and inflate revenues. Exposed counties also see higher shares of cash-based and misvalued real-estate transactions. Our work provides the first indirect evidence of real and financial unintended effects of foreign money-laundering regulations.