Econometrica · 2021 · Kyle Bagwell、Robert W. Staiger、Ali Yürükoğlu
中文摘要
我们构建了一个国际关税谈判模型，以研究关税与贸易总协定/世界贸易组织（GATT/WTO）制度规则的设计。GATT/WTO的一项关键原则是最惠国待遇（MFN）所规定的非歧视要求，这一原则长期以来因助长搭便车行为而受到批评。我们将一个多部门国际贸易模型嵌入一个相互关联的双边关税谈判模型中，并评估最惠国待遇原则的价值。利用1990年的贸易流量和GATT/WTO乌拉圭回合谈判的关税结果，我们估计了该模型，并用其模拟如果放弃最惠国待遇要求、各国就歧视性关税进行谈判，会发生什么。我们发现，如果乌拉圭回合的关税谈判在没有最惠国待遇要求的情况下进行，那么该回合在最惠国待遇要求下进行关税谈判所带来的世界实际收入收益将被完全抵消，世界实际收入反而会相对于1990年的基准情形小幅下降。
Abstract
We develop a model of international tariff negotiations to study the design of the institutional rules of the GATT/WTO. A key principle of the GATT/WTO is its most‐favored‐nation (MFN) requirement of nondiscrimination, a principle that has long been criticized for inviting free‐riding behavior. We embed a multisector model of international trade into a model of interconnected bilateral negotiations over tariffs and assess the value of the MFN principle. Using 1990 trade flows and tariff outcomes from the Uruguay Round of GATT/WTO negotiations, we estimate the model and use it to simulate what would happen if the MFN requirement were abandoned and countries negotiated over discriminatory tariffs. We find that if tariff bargaining in the Uruguay Round had proceeded without the MFN requirement, it would have wiped out the world real income gains that MFN tariff bargaining in the Uruguay Round produced and would have instead led to a small reduction in world real income relative to the 1990 status quo.