Busting the “Princelings”: The Campaign Against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market*
中文摘要
利用2004—2016年间地方政府作为唯一出让方的逾百万宗土地交易数据，我们发现，与中国最高政治精英——中共中央政治局成员——有关联的企业，相较于没有此类关联的企业，获得了55.4%至59.9%的价格折扣。这些企业购买的土地也略多。作为回报，向这些“太子党”企业提供折扣的省委书记，晋升至国家领导职务的可能性高出23.4%。为遏制腐败，习近平主席加大了调查力度，并加强了省级层面的人事控制。利用空间匹配样本（例如，在500米半径范围内进行匹配），我们发现，在被中央巡视组列为巡视对象，或省委书记由习近平任命的人选接替的省份，腐败减少了31.5%至42.6%。相应地，这场反腐行动也显著降低了那些依靠提供折扣谋求晋升的地方官员的晋升前景。
Abstract
Using data on over a million land transactions during 2004–2016 where local governments are the sole seller, we find that firms linked to members of China's supreme political elites—the Politburo—obtained a price discount ranging from 55.4% to 59.9% compared with those without the same connections. These firms also purchased slightly more land. In return, the provincial party secretaries who provided the discount to these “princeling” firms are 23.4% more likely to be promoted to positions of national leadership. To curb corruption, President Xi Jinping stepped up investigations and strengthened personnel control at the province level. Using a spatially matched sample (e.g., within a 500-meter radius), we find a reduction in corruption of between 42.6% and 31.5% in the provinces either targeted by the central inspection teams or whose party secretary was replaced by one appointed by Xi. Accordingly, this crackdown on corruption has also significantly reduced the promotional prospects of those local officials who rely on supplying a discount to get ahead.