Review of Economic Studies · 2021 · Mariana Carrera、Heather Royer、Mark Stehr、Justin Sydnor、Dmitry Taubinsky
中文摘要
本文研究了以自我施加的选择集限制和无财务收益的惩罚为形式的承诺合约邀约，是否为应对自控问题的精准靶向工具。在一项关于健身房出勤的实验（N=1,248）中，我们考察了承诺合约的采纳情况，并引入了一项独立的诱导任务以识别实际与感知的时间不一致性。对于增加健身房出勤的承诺合约存在高采纳率，导致运动量显著增加。然而，该采纳率同时受到噪声估值和关于自身时间不一致性的错误信念的影响。在采纳旨在增加健身房出勤承诺合约的人中，约有半数也采纳了旨在减少健身房出勤的承诺合约。承诺合约采纳率与实际或感知时间不一致性的简约式及结构估计之间几乎无关联。一项提供时间不一致性认知外生冲击的新信息处理降低了对承诺合约的需求。拟双曲贴现与健身房出勤模型的结构估计表明，提供我们的承诺合约降低了消费者剩余，并且与实现相同平均行为变化的线性运动补贴相比，社会效率更低。
Abstract
Abstract This article investigates whether offers of commitment contracts, in the form of self-imposed choice-set restrictions and penalties with no financial upside, are well-targeted tools for addressing self-control problems. In an experiment on gym attendance (N$=1{,}248$), we examine take-up of commitment contracts and also introduce a separate elicitation task to identify actual and perceived time inconsistency. There is high take-up of commitment contracts for greater gym attendance, resulting in significant increases in exercise. However, this take-up is influenced both by noisy valuation and incorrect beliefs about one’s time inconsistency. Approximately half of the people who take up commitment contracts for higher gym attendance also take up commitment contracts for lower gym attendance. There is little association between commitment contract take-up and reduced-form and structural estimates of actual or perceived time inconsistency. A novel information treatment providing an exogenous shock to awareness of time inconsistency reduces demand for commitment contracts. Structural estimates of a model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and gym attendance imply that offering our commitment contracts lowers consumer surplus and is less socially efficient than utilizing linear exercise subsidies that achieve the same average change in behaviour.