Assortative Matching at the Top of the Distribution: Evidence from the World's Most Exclusive Marriage Market
中文摘要
利用英国贵族婚姻的新颖数据，我发现较低的搜寻成本和婚姻市场分割能够产生选型匹配。贵族在伦敦社交季中求偶，这一匹配机制将贵族单身汉介绍给初入社交界的少女。当维多利亚女王为其丈夫服丧时，社交季随之中断（1861—1863年），从而提高了搜寻成本并降低了市场分割。我利用女性在1861年的年龄所导致的中断期间结婚概率的外生变异。此次中断使贵族与平民之间的通婚增加了40%，并使按地产财富的选型匹配下降了30%。最终，这削弱了贵族的政治权力，并影响了19世纪末英格兰的公共政策。（JEL C78, D83, J12, J16, N33）
Abstract
Using novel data on peerage marriages in Britain, I find that low search costs and marriage-market segregation can generate sorting. Peers courted in the London Season, a matching technology introducing aristocratic bachelors to debutantes. When Queen Victoria went into mourning for her husband, the Season was interrupted (1861–1863), raising search costs and reducing market segregation. I exploit exogenous variation in women's probability to marry during the interruption from their age in 1861. The interruption increased peer–commoner intermarriage by 40 percent and reduced sorting along landed wealth by 30 percent. Eventually, this reduced peers' political power and affected public policy in late nineteenth-century England. (JEL C78, D83, J12, J16, N33)