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作为承诺装置的医疗预约

Healthcare Appointments as Commitment Devices
The Economic Journal · 2024 · Laura Derksen、Jason Kerwin、Natalia Ordaz Reynoso、Olivier Sterck

中文摘要

我们表明,普通预约可以作为硬性承诺装置的有效替代,并增加对一项关键医疗服务的需求,尤其是在存在自我控制问题的人群中。我们通过一项向马拉维高风险男性随机提供HIV检测预约和硬性承诺装置的实验展示了这一点。预约使检测率超过原来的两倍,且效应集中于那些有承诺需求的人群。相比之下,大多数接受硬性承诺的男性损失了其投入。预约克服了承诺问题,同时避免了承诺失败这一潜在弊端,并有可能增加发展中国家对医疗服务的需求。

Abstract

We show that ordinary appointments can act as effective substitutes for hard commitment devices and increase demand for a critical healthcare service, particularly among those with self-control problems. We show this using an experiment that randomly offered HIV testing appointments and hard commitment devices to high-risk men in Malawi. Appointments more than double testing rates, with effects concentrated among those who demand commitment. In contrast, most men who take up hard commitments lose their investments. Appointments overcome commitment problems without the potential drawback of commitment failure, and have the potential to increase demand for healthcare in the developing world.
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