贸易竞争与工会组织的衰落:来自认证选举的证据
Trade Competition and the Decline in Union Organizing: Evidence from Certification Elections
Journal of Labor Economics · 2024 · [{"name": "Kerwin Charles", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research"]}, {"name": "Matthew S. Johnson", "affiliation": ["Duke University"]}, {"name": "Nagisa Tadjfar", "affiliation": ["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"]}]
中文摘要
美国工人尝试组织工会的长期下降趋势在2000年后加速。我们发现, 由贸易政策变化引发的中国进口快速增长, 几乎可以解释2000年后这一加速的全部: 工会认证选举不仅在直接暴露于进口冲击的制造业行业工人中大幅减少, 也在通过当地劳动力市场间接暴露于进口冲击的工人中大幅减少。与一个关于工人是否寻求工会代表权之决策的简单模型相一致, 直接暴露降低了工会化带来的预期工资收益, 而间接暴露提高了失业的成本——二者都会抑制工人组织工会。
Abstract
The long-term decline in US workers’ attempts to organize labor unions accelerated after 2000. We find that the swift rise of imports from China arising from a change in trade policy accounts for nearly all of this post-2000 acceleration: union certification elections decreased substantially among workers in manufacturing industries directly exposed to imports, but also among workers indirectly exposed through their local labor market. Consistent with a simple model of workers’ decision to seek union representation, direct exposure lowered the expected wage gain from unionization, whereas indirect exposure increased the cost of job loss—both of which discourage organizing.