最低工资与个体劳动者生产率：来自美国一家大型零售商的证据

中文摘要

我们研究了受雇于美国一家大型零售商、分布在多家门店工作且按绩效计酬的劳动者。通过边界断点分析，我们发现，最低工资上调后，劳动者的生产率提高，被解雇的频率降低。这些效应在薪酬更常受到最低工资托底保障的劳动者中更强。然而，当劳动者受到的监督强度较低时，最低工资会抑制生产率。我们通过效率工资模型解释这些发现。最低工资上调后，利润下降，而一项校准分析提示，劳动者福利有所增加。

Abstract

We study workers who are employed by a large US retailer, work in many store locations, and are paid based on performance. By means of a border-discontinuity analysis, we document that workers become more productive and are terminated less often after a minimum wage increase. These effects are stronger among workers whose pay is more often supported by the minimum wage. However, when workers are monitored less intensely, the minimum wage depresses productivity. We interpret these findings through an efficiency wage model. After a minimum wage increase, profits decrease, and a calibration exercise suggests that worker welfare increases.