创意世界中的顶端收入征税

中文摘要

本文考察在以下条件下对顶端收入征税的问题：（i）新创意驱动经济增长；（ii）成功创新的回报是顶端收入；（iii）研究补贴无法完全精准地定向支持创新——想想沃尔玛的经营方法、优步的创立，或亚马逊这一“创意”。这些条件引出了一种影响最优最高税率的新力量：对顶端收入征税会减缓推动总体GDP的新创意的产生，从而降低所有人的收入，而不仅仅是收入顶端人群的收入。这一力量对实现税收收入最大化和福利最大化的最高税率都构成了很强的约束。

Abstract

This paper considers top income taxation when (i) new ideas drive economic growth, (ii) the reward for successful innovation is a top income, and (iii) innovation cannot be perfectly targeted by a research subsidy—think about the business methods of Walmart, the creation of Uber, or the “idea” of Amazon. These conditions lead to a new force affecting the optimal top tax rate: by slowing the creation of new ideas that drive aggregate GDP, top income taxation reduces everyone’s income, not just income at the top. This force sharply constrains both revenue-maximizing and welfare-maximizing top tax rates.