拉里·鲍尔的《美联储与雷曼兄弟》：一篇书评文章

中文摘要

劳伦斯·鲍尔认为，联邦储备系统（美联储）本可以——也应该——救助雷曼兄弟，使其不必宣布破产。他提供了令人信服的证据，表明美联储本有能力实施救助。我认为，鉴于美联储当时所处的境况，认为美联储不应救助雷曼兄弟的观点是合理的。雷曼兄弟破产案为研究救助及其伴随的、由救助预期引发的道德风险问题提供了一个案例。从中汲取的教训表明，有充分理由采取适当的监管干预，以解决政府无法承诺不实施救助时所产生的问题。

Abstract

Laurence Ball argues that the Federal Reserve (the Fed) could—and should—have bailed out Lehman Brothers so that it did not have to declare bankruptcy. He presents compelling evidence that it could have. I argue that the view that the Fed should not bail out Lehman is reasonable under the circumstances the Fed was in at the time. The Lehman bankruptcy is a case study in bailouts and the attendant moral hazard problem that expectations of bailouts create. The lessons learned imply a clear case for appropriate regulatory intervention to solve the problems created when governments cannot commit themselves to not undertake bailouts. (JEL D72, E32, E58, E63, G01, G24, G33)