Addressing weak links in government implementation at scale: Experimental evidence from a school governance reform in Tanzania
中文摘要
本文说明了低成本创新如何改善高成本政府项目的实施效果。我们通过实验评估了坦桑尼亚一项新学校治理项目的全国推广。作为该项目的一部分，学校督学开展全校访问（WSVs），形成一套针对学校具体情况的评级与建议，分别面向学校领导、教师和家长，旨在提升学校质量。然而，学校缺乏落实这些建议的有力激励，而负责开展后续访问的地方监察员向另一个部门汇报，无法直接获取WSV报告。为应对这一挑战，在随机抽取的一部分项目学校中，监察员收到短信，被告知主要建议并被鼓励跟进学校以确保合规。在接受WSV的学校样本中，短信干预使学生学习成绩在两年后提高了0.11个标准差。处理效应在各领域督查评级较差的学校中更大，这与监察员依据量身定制而非通用性建议采取行动的机制相一致。观察到的收益集中在那些曾获捐助方项目支持、为地方官员提供监督资源的地区。我们的研究结果表明，解决实施过程中的具体瓶颈能够显著提升政府项目在大规模推行中的有效性。
Abstract
This paper demonstrates how low-cost innovations can improve the implementation of costly government programs. We experimentally evaluate the nationwide roll-out of a new school governance program in Tanzania. As part of the program, school inspectors conduct Whole School Visits (WSVs) producing a set of school-specific ratings and recommendations—targeted at leadership, teachers, and parents—for improving school quality. However, schools faced weak incentives to implement the recommendations, and the local monitors responsible for conducting follow-up visits, who report to a different ministry, lacked direct access to WSV reports. To address this challenge, in a randomly sampled subset of program schools, monitors received text messages informing them of the main recommendations and encouraging them to follow up with schools to ensure compliance. Within the sample of schools that received WSVs, text messages improved student learning by 0.11 standard deviations after two years. Treatment effects are larger for schools that received worse inspection ratings in each domain, consistent with monitors acting on tailored rather than generic recommendations. Observed gains are concentrated in regions exposed to a donor program that provided local bureaucrats with resources to monitor. Our findings show how addressing specific bottlenecks in implementation can significantly enhance the effectiveness of government programs at scale.