中文摘要
对保险的支付意愿仅反映保险针对选择被观测到时仍然存在的风险所提供的保障价值。本文开发了一套工具，用于在部分可保信息已揭示之后才观测到选择的情况下，衡量保险补贴和强制参保对事前期望效用的影响。该方法保留了使用简约式支付意愿曲线和成本曲线的透明性，但额外引入了一个充分统计量：参保者与未参保者之间边际效用的百分比差异。我提出了一种估计这一额外统计量的方法，只需使用简约式支付意愿曲线，并结合一项风险厌恶度量。我将该方法与需要完整设定个体选择环境和信息集的结构式方法进行了比较。我利用马萨诸塞州面向低收入人群的医疗保险交易所现有的支付意愿曲线和成本曲线估计结果，应用了该方法。事前最优保险价格比使观测到的市场剩余最大化的价格低约30%。尽管强制参保会减少市场剩余，但结果提示，它实际上可能会提高事前期望效用。
Abstract
Abstract The willingness to pay for insurance captures the value of insurance against only the risk that remains when choices are observed. This article develops tools to measure the ex ante expected utility impact of insurance subsidies and mandates when choices are observed after some insurable information is revealed. The approach retains the transparency of using reduced-form willingness to pay and cost curves, but it adds one additional sufficient statistic: the percentage difference in marginal utilities between insured and uninsured. I provide an approach to estimate this additional statistic that uses only the reduced-form willingness to pay curve, combined with a measure of risk aversion. I compare the approach to structural approaches that require fully specifying the choice environment and information sets of individuals. I apply the approach using existing willingness to pay and cost curve estimates from the low-income health insurance exchange in Massachusetts. Ex ante optimal insurance prices are roughly 30% lower than prices that maximize observed market surplus. While mandates reduce market surplus, the results suggest they would actually increase ex ante expected utility.