规范、执法与逃税
Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion
Review of Economics and Statistics · 2021 · Timothy Besley、Anders Jensen、Torsten Persson
中文摘要
本文研究逃税中的个体动机与社会动机。我们构建了一个简单的动态模型，纳入这些动机及其相互作用。社会动机支撑着规范的作用，也是我们所研究的动态变化的来源。我们的实证分析利用了英国于1990年为地方政府筹资而引入人头税这一事件，该举措导致了广泛的逃税行为。证据与模型关于逃税动态变化的主要预测一致。
Abstract
Abstract This paper studies individual and social motives in tax evasion. We build a simple dynamic model that incorporates these motives and their interaction. The social motives underpin the role of norms and are the source of the dynamics that we study. Our empirical analysis exploits the adoption in 1990 of a poll tax to fund local government in the United Kingdom, which led to widespread evasion. The evidence is consistent with the model's main predictions on the dynamics of evasion.