最低工资、低薪工人与不完全执法下的合规性
Minimum wages, low-wage workers, and compliance under imperfect enforcement
Journal of Development Economics · 2026 · [{"name": "Nicolás González-Pampillón", "affiliation": ["Centre for Economic Policy Research"]}, {"name": "Javier Vázquez-Grenno", "affiliation": ["Universitat de Barcelona"]}]
中文摘要
本文考察乌拉圭——一个中等收入发展中经济体——大幅提高最低工资对劳动力市场结果的影响。利用行政数据和双重差分方法, 我们研究了2005年一项改革的效果, 该改革在一年内将实际最低工资提高了80%。我们发现低薪工人获得了大幅且持续的工资增长, 而对就业或工作时长没有统计显著的影响。除劳动力市场结果外, 我们还记录到对法定工资下限的遵从度出现暂时性下降, 尤其是在小型企业中, 随后执法力度逐步加强。总体而言, 我们的结果凸显了执法能力与制度特征如何塑造发展中经济体最低工资改革的效应。
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of a substantial minimum wage increase in Uruguay — a middle-income developing economy — on labor market outcomes. Using administrative data and a difference-in-differences approach, we study the effects of a 2005 reform that raised the real minimum wage by 80 percent within a year. We find large and persistent wage gains for low-paid workers, with no statistically significant effects on employment or hours worked. Beyond labor market outcomes, we document a temporary decline in compliance with the statutory wage floor, particularly among smaller firms, followed by a gradual strengthening of enforcement. Overall, our results highlight how enforcement capacity and institutional features shape the effects of minimum wage reforms in developing economies.