联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）内部的透明度与审议：一种计算语言学方法*

中文摘要

透明度作为中央银行制度设计的一项关键特征，如何影响货币政策制定者的审议？理论预测，透明度会产生正向的约束效应和负向的从众效应。我们利用1993年联邦公开市场委员会的一项自然实验以及计算语言学算法，对这些效应进行实证考察。首先，我们发现，提高透明度后，沟通模式发生了较大变化。随后，我们提出一种受职业顾虑文献启发的双重差分方法，并找到了支持这两种效应的证据。最后，我们构建了一项影响力测度，该测度提示约束效应占主导地位。

Abstract

How does transparency, a key feature of central bank design, affect monetary policy makers’ deliberations? Theory predicts a positive discipline effect and negative conformity effect. We empirically explore these effects using a natural experiment in the Federal Open Market Committee in 1993 and computational linguistics algorithms. We first find large changes in communication patterns after transparency. We then propose a difference-in-differences approach inspired by the career concerns literature, and find evidence for both effects. Finally, we construct an influence measure that suggests the discipline effect dominates.