Journal of Development Economics · 2026 · Jonah Matthew Rexer、Even Soltvedt Hvinden
中文摘要
自然资源非法市场在许多冲突后环境中蓬勃发展。我们提出，国家能力薄弱的国家可能默许非法资源市场的存在，将其作为与暴力性非国家团体分享租金的机制。利用有关尼日尔河三角洲石油冲突中武装组织指挥官的所在地、袭击及黑市活动的原创数据，我们表明，2009年的大赦协议使武装活动持续减少，却使石油盗窃大幅增加。运用一个无法作出可信承诺的冲突谈判模型，我们表明，对于在非法活动成本较低的地区面对强大叛军的政府而言，遏制资源盗窃的成本高昂，因此国家可能更倾向于默许资源盗窃。我们发现，在这些地区，冲突后的石油盗窃处于较高水平，而政府对黑市的执法力度较弱。我们的分析凸显了当地经济条件以及国家与非国家行为者的相对军事能力如何共同塑造资源盗窃的激励。
Abstract
Illicit markets for natural resources thrive in many post-conflict settings. We propose that weak states may tacitly allow illicit resource markets as a rent-sharing mechanism with violent non-state groups. Using original data on the locations, attacks, and black-market activities of militant commanders in the Niger Delta oil conflict, we show that a 2009 amnesty agreement led to sustained declines in militant activity, but substantial growth in oil theft. Using a no-commitment conflict bargaining model, we show that deterring resource theft is costly for a government facing powerful rebels in locations with low costs of illicit activity, so the state may prefer to tacitly allow resource theft. We find that post-conflict oil theft is elevated and government enforcement against black markets is muted in these areas. Our analysis highlights how local economic conditions and relative military capabilities of state and non-state actors jointly shape incentives for resource theft.