最优监督下的援助分配：理论与政策

中文摘要

我们在需求与援助有效性之间的权衡这一熟悉的框架下，探讨允许厌恶贫困的援助方监督援助使用所带来的影响。本文着重研究两国之间的最优援助分配，其中援助方同时决定援助份额和针对各国的监督努力，监督旨在增加贫困人口实际获得的援助金额。研究表明，将援助有效性内生化会提高治理较差国家中贫困人口的收入，但未必会提高治理较好国家中贫困人口的收入，而对各国援助份额的影响则在本质上是不确定的。对基本模型作多种扩展后，这些结果依然成立。应根据这些结果重新审视传统的援助分配规则。

Abstract

We explore the implications of allowing a poverty-averse donor to monitor aid use within the familiar context of the needs vs. aid effectiveness tradeoff. The paper focuses on the optimal aid allocation between two countries when the donor simultaneously decides about aid shares and country-specific monitoring effort aimed at increasing the amount reaching the poor. Endogenizing aid effectiveness is shown to raise the poor’s income in the worse-governed country, yet not necessarily in the better-governed one, whereas the effect on country aid shares is essentially ambiguous. Those results still hold when the basic model is extended in various directions. Conventional aid allocation rules should be re-examined in their light.