中文摘要
我们提出了一项基于竞争政策的论据，支持在消费者注意力有限时，对产品本身复杂或定价复杂的产品的次要特征进行监管。注意力有限意味着，消费者只能全面“研读”少数几种复杂产品，而通过不检查次要特征，他们可以粗略地“浏览”更多产品。通过安全法规、对某些费用设置上限或其他方式限制消费者事后受到的损害，会促使消费者进行更多或更有意义的浏览，从而增强竞争。我们表明，要产生促进竞争的效果，监管必须针对产品的次要特征，而非产品的总价格或总价值。作为一项辅助性的实证性预测，我们证明，由于低价值消费者往往比高价值消费者更可能研读、因而更不可能浏览，消费者支付的平均价格可能随着低价值消费者占比的上升而上升。我们讨论了这些见解在健康保险选择、欧盟关于不公平合同条款的原则、发展中国家的食品安全，以及低收入和高收入消费者的购物行为（及其支付的价格）方面的应用。
Abstract
Abstract We identify a competition-policy-based argument for regulating the secondary features of complex or complexly priced products when consumers have limited attention. Limited attention implies that consumers can only “study” a small number of complex products in full, while—by failing to check secondary features—they can superficially “browse” more. Interventions limiting ex post consumer harm through safety regulations, caps on certain fees, or other methods induce consumers to do more or more meaningful browsing, enhancing competition. We show that for a pro-competitive effect to obtain, the regulation must apply to the secondary features, and not to the total price or value of the product. As an auxiliary positive prediction, we establish that because low-value consumers are often more likely to study—and therefore less likely to browse—than high-value consumers, the average price consumers pay can be increasing in the share of low-value consumers. We discuss applications of our insights to health-insurance choice, the European Union’s principle on unfair contract terms, food safety in developing countries, and the shopping behaviour of (and prices paid by) low-income and high-income consumers.