大空头（利息）：填补股息预扣税中的漏洞
The Big Short (Interest): Closing the Loopholes in the Dividend-Withholding Tax
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2026 · [{"name": "Elisa Casi", "affiliation": ["Norwegian School of Economics"]}, {"name": "Evelina Gavrilova", "affiliation": ["Norwegian School of Economics"]}, {"name": "David Murphy", "affiliation": ["Norwegian School of Economics"]}, {"name": "Floris Zoutman", "affiliation": ["Norwegian School of Economics"]}]
中文摘要
我们研究更严格执行股息预提税（DWT）的影响。我们聚焦于丹麦2016年的一项执法改革，并将丹麦与其北欧邻国进行比较。在整个北欧股票市场，借出的股票在股息日前后急剧激增。这些激增与滥用DWT制度的行为相一致。改革后，丹麦的激增消失，年度DWT收入增加了130%。以丹麦股票收益率、投资率和股息收益率衡量，执法并未损害投资环境。（JEL G18, G35, G38, H26, K22, K34）
Abstract
We study the effect of stricter enforcement of the dividend-withholding tax (DWT). We focus on a 2016 Danish enforcement reform and compare Denmark to its Nordic neighbors. Throughout the Nordic stock markets, shares on loan spike sharply around dividend dates. These spikes are consistent with abuse of the DWT system. Postreform, spikes in Denmark disappear, and annual DWT revenue increases by 130 percent. Enforcement does not harm the investment climate as measured by Danish stock returns, investment rate, and dividend yield. (JEL G18, G35, G38, H26, K22, K34)