Journal of the European Economic Association · 2026 · Georgy Egorov、Sergei Guriev、Maxim Mironov、Ekaterina Zhuravskaya
中文摘要
为什么政治竞选常常产生出乎意料的结果?我们通过分别估计竞选活动对目标选民的直接效应与对同一社会环境中其他人的间接效应来回答这一问题。在阿根廷2023年总统选举期间,我们与一家当地非政府组织 (NGO) 合作,随机发放传单,内容是对局外人候选人哈维尔·米莱 (Javier Milei) 的若干政策主张可能后果的专家评估。利用阿根廷独特的次选区 (sub-precinct) 选举计票报告系统,我们发现该竞选活动如预期般降低了直接受处理选民对米莱的支持,但提高了受处理选区内未受处理选民对他的支持,从而产生了一种事与愿违、对米莱净为正的效应。一项预注册的复制研究证实了这些符号相反的效应。借助理论和一个调查实验,我们表明,不相信该竞选宣传的少数选民更有动机与同伴讨论它,并说服他们支持米莱。当竞选活动批评局外人候选人时,这种动员效应似乎尤其容易出现。我们的结果凸显了针对反精英候选人的竞选活动如何在无意之中为其动员了支持。
Abstract
Abstract Why do political campaigns so often yield unexpected results? We address this question by separately estimating the direct effect of a campaign on targeted voters and the indirect effect on others in the same social environment. Partnering with a local NGO during Argentina’s 2023 presidential election, we randomized the distribution of leaflets providing an expert assessment of the likely consequences of certain proposals by the outsider candidate Javier Milei. Exploiting Argentina’s unique sub-precinct election reporting system, we show that the campaign reduced Milei’s support among directly treated voters, as expected, but increased his support among untreated voters in treated precincts, producing a backfiring, net-positive effect for Milei. A pre-registered replication confirmed these opposite-signed effects. Using theory and a survey experiment, we show that the minority of voters who disbelieved the campaign were more motivated to discuss it with peers, convincing them to support Milei. This mobilization effect appears especially likely when campaigns criticize outsider candidates. Our results highlight how campaigns aimed at anti-elite candidates can unintentionally mobilize support for them.