American Economic Review · 2022 · Volker Nocke、Michael D. Whinston
中文摘要
基于集中度的横向并购阈值（如美国《横向并购指南》中的相关阈值）在并购分析中发挥着核心作用，但其依据仍不明确。我们表明，在筛查并购的单边价格效应是否会损害消费者时，仅关注集中度的变化而忽略其水平，既有理论依据，也有实证依据。我们还认为，当前的阈值水平很可能过于宽松，除非预期效率提升达到5%或以上，或者预期市场进入和产品重新定位等其他因素能显著约束并购后市场势力的行使。（JEL D43, G34, G38, K21, L13, L41）
Abstract
Concentration-based thresholds for horizontal mergers, such as those in the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, play a central role in merger analysis but their basis remains unclear. We show that there is both a theoretical and an empirical basis for focusing solely on the change in concentration, and ignoring its level, in screening mergers for whether their unilateral price effects will harm consumers. We also argue that current threshold levels likely are too lax, unless one expects efficiency gains of 5 percent or greater, or other factors such as entry and product repositioning to significantly constrain the exercise of market power postmerger. (JEL D43, G34, G38, K21, L13, L41)