Coordination and Commitment in International Climate Action: Evidence From Palm Oil
Econometrica · 2026 · [{"name": "Allan Hsiao", "affiliation": ["Stanford University"]}]
中文摘要
薄弱的环境规制具有全球性后果。当国内规制失效时，国际社会可以通过贸易政策针对排放者。本文构建了一个动态实证框架，用以评估贸易政策作为国内规制的替代方案，并将该框架应用于棕榈油市场——棕榈油是森林砍伐与全球 CO₂ 排放的一个主要驱动因素。相对于基准情景（business as usual），50% 的国内生产税在 1988 年至 2016 年间使 CO₂ 排放减少 7.4 Gt，相当于每年 0.26 Gt。同期，幅度相近、协调一致且承诺实施的进口关税使排放减少 5.4 Gt。即便计入承认生产国福利损失的补偿性转移，这些进口关税的成本也仅为每吨 CO₂ 15 美元。在缺乏协调与承诺的情况下，进口关税的效果更为有限。替代政策还包括国内出口税与碳边境调节机制：前者即便不考虑排放问题也具有财政吸引力，后者则鼓励国内规制。
Abstract
Weak environmental regulation has global consequences. When domestic regulation fails, the international community can target emitters with trade policy. I develop a dynamic empirical framework for evaluating trade policy as a substitute for domestic regulation, and I apply the framework to the market for palm oil, a major driver of deforestation and global CO 2 emissions. Relative to business as usual, a domestic production tax of 50% reduces CO 2 emissions by 7.4 Gt from 1988 to 2016, amounting to 0.26 Gt annually. Coordinated, committed import tariffs of similar magnitude reduce emissions by 5.4 Gt over the same period. The cost of these import tariffs is only $15 per ton of CO 2 , even accounting for compensating transfers that recognize welfare losses for producing countries. Without coordination and commitment, import tariffs have more limited effects. Alternative policies include domestic export taxes, which are fiscally appealing independent of emission concerns, and a carbon border adjustment mechanism, which encourages domestic regulation.