Coordination and Commitment in International Climate Action: Evidence From Palm Oil
中文摘要
薄弱的环境监管会产生全球性后果。当国内监管失效时，国际社会可以利用贸易政策针对排放者。我构建了一个动态实证框架，用于评估贸易政策作为国内监管替代手段的作用，并将该框架应用于棕榈油市场——棕榈油是森林砍伐和全球二氧化碳排放的主要驱动因素。与照常发展情景相比，50%的国内生产税使1988年至2016年间的二氧化碳排放量减少7.4吉吨，相当于每年减少0.26吉吨。幅度相近、经过协调且具有可信承诺的进口关税，在同一时期使排放量减少5.4吉吨。即使计入旨在补偿生产国福利损失的转移支付，这些进口关税的成本也仅为每吨二氧化碳15美元。若缺乏协调与承诺，进口关税的效果则较为有限。其他备选政策包括国内出口税——无论排放问题与否，它在财政上都具有吸引力——以及能够鼓励国内监管的碳边境调节机制。
Abstract
Weak environmental regulation has global consequences. When domestic regulation fails, the international community can target emitters with trade policy. I develop a dynamic empirical framework for evaluating trade policy as a substitute for domestic regulation, and I apply the framework to the market for palm oil, a major driver of deforestation and global CO 2 emissions. Relative to business as usual, a domestic production tax of 50% reduces CO 2 emissions by 7.4 Gt from 1988 to 2016, amounting to 0.26 Gt annually. Coordinated, committed import tariffs of similar magnitude reduce emissions by 5.4 Gt over the same period. The cost of these import tariffs is only $15 per ton of CO 2 , even accounting for compensating transfers that recognize welfare losses for producing countries. Without coordination and commitment, import tariffs have more limited effects. Alternative policies include domestic export taxes, which are fiscally appealing independent of emission concerns, and a carbon border adjustment mechanism, which encourages domestic regulation.