Review of Economic Studies · 2020 · Aaron Bodoh-Creed、Jörn Boehnke、Brent Richard Hickman
中文摘要
本文构建了一个去中心化、动态的拍卖市场平台模型，其中连续统的买方与卖方在每个时期参与同时进行的单件拍卖。模型考虑了参与主体的内生进入以及跨期优化对出价的影响。我们利用eBay上的Kindle销售数据估计了模型的结构性原始参数。研究发现，eBay上仅略超过三分之一的Kindle拍卖导致了无效率配置，其无谓损失相当于全部可能市场剩余的14%。我们还发现，部分中心化——例如每天运行一半数量的2件、统一价格拍卖——将消除很大一部分无效率，但会降低卖方收入。研究结果还凸显了在评估市场重新设计的影响时，理解平台构成效应——即参与主体进入市场的选择——的重要性。我们还证明了，在买方与卖方为连续统的情况下，本文模型的均衡是主体数量有限时类似模型的近似均衡。
Abstract
Abstract We model a decentralized, dynamic auction market platform in which a continuum of buyers and sellers participate in simultaneous, single-unit auctions each period. Our model accounts for the endogenous entry of agents and the impact of intertemporal optimization on bids. We estimate the structural primitives of our model using Kindle sales on eBay. We find that just over one-third of Kindle auctions on eBay result in an inefficient allocation with deadweight loss amounting to 14% of total possible market surplus. We also find that partial centralization—for example, running half as many 2-unit, uniform-price auctions each day—would eliminate a large fraction of the inefficiency, but yield lower seller revenues. Our results also highlight the importance of understanding platform composition effects—selection of agents into the market—in assessing the implications of market redesign. We also prove that the equilibrium of our model with a continuum of buyers and sellers is an approximate equilibrium of the analogous model with a finite number of agents.