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教师招聘与留任中的监管套利:来自马萨诸塞州特许学校的证据

Regulatory arbitrage in teacher hiring and retention: Evidence from Massachusetts Charter Schools
Journal of Public Economics · 2022 · Jesse Bruhn、Scott Andrew Imberman、Marcus A. Winters

中文摘要

我们通过考察马萨诸塞州教师留任情况如何随教师质量变化,研究特许学校的人事灵活性。我们提出一个模型,其中固定成本较高的教育工作者在获得薪酬更高的公共部门岗位所需的执照之前,利用特许学校探索从教的职业道路。该理论模型的一个关键含义是,特许学校通过提高可供聘用的教师劳动力的平均质量,为传统公立学校创造正外部性。实证结果呈现出与该模型一致的模式。具体而言,我们发现,特许学校更有可能流失其增值最高和最低的教师。表现不佳的教师倾向于退出公共教育,而表现优异的教师则倾向于转入传统公立学校。

Abstract

We study personnel flexibility in charter schools by exploring how teacher retention varies with teacher quality in Massachusetts. We propose a model in which educators with high fixed-costs use charter schools to explore teaching careers before obtaining licenses required for higher paying public sector jobs. A key implication of the theoretical model is that charter schools create positive externalities for traditional public schools by increasing the average quality of available teacher labor. Empirical results show patterns consistent with the model. In particular, we show that charters are more likely to lose their highest and lowest value-added teachers. Low performers tend to exit public education, while high performers tend to switch to traditional public schools.
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