中文摘要
我提出了一个新的一般均衡框架，用以量化执法对企业内部组织的影响，以及由此对总体经济结果产生的影响。模型刻画了企业与其中层管理者之间的代理问题。执法不完善使中层管理者得以挪用企业收入，从而减少管理授权并限制企业规模。我使用法国雇主—雇员匹配数据，为模型所刻画的管理者工资模式提供证据。相对于法国基准经济体，将执法水平降至其最低值会使GDP下降23%（等价于全要素生产率〔TFP〕下降23%），并使自雇率增至原来的三倍。我提供的跨国经验证据表明，执法指标与管理人员在总体就业中的占比呈正相关，这与模型一致。将模型应用于全球各国后，模型能够解释最贫穷与最富裕两个国家五分位组之间每名劳动者GDP比率的3–6%，以及这两组国家之间TFP比率的6–11%。
Abstract
Abstract I propose a novel general equilibrium framework to quantify the impact of law enforcement on the internal organization of firms and thereby on aggregate outcomes. The model features an agency problem between the firm and its middle managers. Imperfect law enforcement allows middle managers to divert revenue from firms, which reduces delegation and constrains firm size. I use French matched employer–employee data for evidence of the model’s pattern of managerial wages. Relative to the French benchmark economy, reducing law enforcement to its minimum value decreases GDP (equivalently, total factor productivity; TFP) by 23% and triples the self-employment rate. Consistent with the model, I document cross-country empirical evidence of a positive correlation between law enforcement indicators and the aggregate share of managerial workers. Mapped across the world, the model explains 3–6% of the ratio in GDP per worker between the poorest and richest quintile of countries, and 6–11% of their TFP ratio.