Review of Economic Studies · 2019 · Nano Barahona、Francisco Gallego、Juan‐Pablo Montero
中文摘要
当地空气污染促使世界各地许多城市的当局通过限行或车牌限行来限制汽车使用。由于对所有汽车实行统一限制，许多此类政策激励驾驶者额外购买污染更重的汽车。我们研究基于车龄的限行措施，这类措施对较老、污染较重的车辆施加严格限制，而对较新、较清洁的车辆不设限制。我们利用一个新颖的汽车市场模型以及圣地亚哥1992年政策的实施结果，表明此类限行措施在设计上应仅通过广延边际（所驾驶车辆的类型）发挥作用，绝不通过集约边际（行驶里程数）发挥作用。圣地亚哥的这项政策是最早采用基于车龄的限行措施的政策。如果按上述方式设计，基于车龄的限行措施便可通过推动车队构成向更清洁的汽车转变，带来重要的福利增益，且与车辆报废补贴和基于污染水平的车辆登记费等替代性政策工具相比也表现良好。
Abstract
Abstract Local air pollution has led authorities in many cities around the world to impose limits on car use by means of driving restrictions or license-plate bans. By placing uniform restrictions on all cars, many of these programs have created incentives for drivers to buy additional, more polluting cars. We study vintage-specific restrictions, which place heavy limits on older, polluting vehicles and no limits on newer, cleaner ones. We use a novel model of the car market and results from Santiago’s 1992 program, the earliest program to use vintage-specific restrictions, to show that such restrictions should be designed to work exclusively through the extensive margin (type of car driven), never through the intensive margin (number of miles driven). If so, vintage restrictions can yield important welfare gains by moving the fleet composition toward cleaner cars, comparing well to alternative instruments such as scrappage subsidies and pollution-based registration fees.