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部长也会偏袒

Ministers Engage in Favoritism Too
Journal of Public Economics · 2022 · Philine Widmer、Noémie Zurlinden

中文摘要

为研究36个非洲国家内阁成员的偏袒行为,我们手工收集了2001—2015年间所有内阁成员的出生地信息。我们聚焦健康结果,提供了卫生部长存在偏袒行为的因果证据,关键部长存在偏袒行为的相关证据则较弱。当现任卫生部长来自新生儿和婴儿所在地区时,他们的死亡率更低,弱势母亲(居住在农村或未受过教育的母亲)的孩子尤其如此。与母亲来自同一地区的卫生部长还提高了她们分娩时的医疗服务可及性,对弱势母亲而言尤其如此。因此,医疗服务可及性很可能解释了死亡率降低效应的一部分。我们发现了族群动机在偏袒行为中发挥作用的证据,但未发现(短期)选举动机发挥作用的证据。

Abstract

To study favoritism by cabinet members in 36 African countries, we hand-collect birthplace information for all cabinet members (2001–2015). Focusing on health outcomes, we provide causal evidence of favoritism by health ministers and, less so, key ministers. Neonates’ and infants’ mortality is lower when the current health minister originates from their region, especially for children of vulnerable (rural-based or uneducated) mothers. Co-regional health ministers also increase healthcare access at birth, particularly for vulnerable mothers. Thus, healthcare access likely explains part of the mortality-lowering effects. We find evidence for ethnic motives playing a role in favoritism but not (short-run) electoral motives.
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