Emissions abatement under a rate-based emissions trading system: facility-level evidence from China
Journal of Public Economics · 2026 · Yifei Quan、Jie‐Sheng Tan‐Soo、Maosheng Duan、Bofeng Cai
中文摘要
作为按覆盖排放量计全球最大的碳排放交易体系（ETS），中国全国碳排放交易体系采用非常规的基于强度标准的设计来分配配额，这内在地产生了“赢家”（配额盈余单位）与“输家”（配额赤字单位）。利用独特的设施层面数据集与连续双重差分框架，我们表明全国碳排放交易体系使受管制发电机组的 CO₂ 排放下降 2.3%。关键在于，这一减排主要由产出从赤字单位向盈余单位的再配置驱动，而非来自单位内部的效率提升或燃料转换。此外，这种产出替代在同一区域电网或同一母公司内部的机组之间更为明显。该政策还通过减少受管制电厂的空气污染带来了可观的协同效益。我们的发现为基于强度标准的碳排放交易体系的有效性提供了事后证据，并为寻求在维持产出水平的同时实现大范围减排的政策制定者提供了启示。
Abstract
As the world’s largest emissions trading system (ETS) by covered emissions, China’s national ETS uses an unconventional rate-based design to allocate allowances, which inherently creates “winners” (surplus units) and “losers” (deficit units). Utilizing a unique facility-level dataset and a continuous difference-in-differences framework, we show that the national ETS reduces CO 2 emissions from regulated power units by 2.3 %. Crucially, this abatement is mainly driven by reallocating output from deficit to surplus units instead of within-unit efficiency gains or fuel switching. Moreover, such output substitution is more pronounced among units within the same regional grids or parent companies. This policy also delivers substantial co-benefits by reducing air pollution from regulated plants. Our findings contribute ex- post evidence on the effectiveness of rate-based ETSs and offer insights for policymakers seeking to mitigate emissions on a broad scale while maintaining production levels.