中文摘要
我们构建、估计并检验了一个易于处理的买方寡头垄断一般均衡模型，其中工作存在差异化且劳动力市场是集中的。我们通过匹配关于企业本地劳动力市场份额与其就业和工资对州企业所得税变化的反应之间关系的新证据，估计了关键模型参数。该模型在数量上复现了关于生产率—工资不完全传导以及主导雇主战略性工资设定的准实验证据。相对于有效配置，劳动力市场势力导致的福利损失为7.6%，而产出则低20.9%。最后，1977年至2013年间，本地集中度的下降为劳动收入份额增加了4个百分点。（JEL E25, H71, J24, J31, J42, R23）
Abstract
We develop, estimate, and test a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopsony with differentiated jobs and concentrated labor markets. We estimate key model parameters by matching new evidence on the relationship between firms’ local labor market share and their employment and wage responses to state corporate tax changes. The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on imperfect productivity-wage pass-through and strategic wage setting of dominant employers. Relative to the efficient allocation, welfare losses from labor market power are 7.6 percent, while output is 20.9 percent lower. Lastly, declining local concentration added 4 percentage points to labor’s share of income between 1977 and 2013. (JEL E25, H71, J24, J31, J42, R23)