Review of Economic Studies · 2020 · Adam Guren、Timothy J. McQuade
中文摘要
本文运用结构模型表明，止赎在加剧近期住房市场暴跌中发挥了关键作用，并分析了止赎缓解政策。我们考察一个动态搜寻模型：止赎使非止赎房产市场的交易陷于停滞，并通过侵蚀贷款人权益、破坏潜在买家的信用以及使买家更加挑剔，降低价格和销售量。这些效应引发价格—违约螺旋，放大初始冲击，并使该模型对全国层面和横截面的矩的拟合均优于不含止赎的模型。针对近期住房市场暴跌进行校准后，模型显示，止赎产生的放大效应显著：信用受损和买家更加挑剔这两个因素解释了非困境房产价格总跌幅的25.4%，贷款人损失则额外解释了22.6%。在政策方面，我们发现，本金减记的成本效益低于向贷款人注入权益资本，也低于引入一个单一卖方，由其持有止赎房产，直到需求回升后再投放市场。我们还表明，减缓止赎进程的政策可能适得其反。
Abstract
Abstract This article uses a structural model to show that foreclosures played a crucial role in exacerbating the recent housing bust and to analyse foreclosure mitigation policy. We consider a dynamic search model in which foreclosures freeze the market for non-foreclosures and reduce price and sales volume by eroding lender equity, destroying the credit of potential buyers, and making buyers more selective. These effects cause price-default spirals that amplify an initial shock and help the model fit both national and cross-sectional moments better than a model without foreclosure. When calibrated to the recent bust, the model reveals that the amplification generated by foreclosures is significant: ruined credit and choosey buyers account for 25.4% of the total decline in non-distressed prices and lender losses account for an additional 22.6%. For policy, we find that principal reduction is less cost-effective than lender equity injections or introducing a single seller that holds foreclosures off the market until demand rebounds. We also show that policies that slow down the pace of foreclosures can be counterproductive.