中文摘要
应用于立法机构的多边谈判与联盟形成理论预测，政党的席位份额决定其谈判力量。我们的研究发现难以与这一预测相调和，却符合“得票最多的政党应当组建政府”这一规范。我们首先介绍若干国家的案例研究，以及基于28个欧洲国家议会的断点回归设计证据。随后，我们聚焦于2,898场西班牙市政选举，在这些选举中，两个政党的席位数相同。我们发现，普选得票数略多的政党任命市长的可能性要大得多。由于席位数相同的政党平均而言应当具有同等的谈判力量，这就识别出了被冠以“得票最多”这一称号的效应。该效应与多获得一个席位的效应相当；即使得票最多的是右翼政党，而得票数位居第二和第三的是相互结盟、合计能够占据多数席位的左翼政党，该效应也依然存在。一个选举既汇集信息又约束现任执政者的模型可以合理解释我们的结果，并产生额外的预测，我们利用数据对这些预测加以检验，例如，选民会惩罚任命市长的得票数位居第二的政党。
Abstract
Abstract Theories of multilateral bargaining and coalition formation applied to legislatures predict that parties’ seat shares determine their bargaining power. We present findings that are difficult to reconcile with this prediction, but consistent with a norm prescribing that “the most voted party should form the government”. We first present case studies from several countries and regression discontinuity design-based evidence from twenty-eight national European parliaments. We then focus on 2,898 Spanish municipal elections in which two parties tie in the number of seats. We find that the party with slightly more general election votes is substantially more likely to appoint the mayor. Since tied parties should (on average) have equal bargaining power, this identifies the effect of being labeled the most voted. This effect is comparable to that of obtaining an additional seat, and is also present when a right-wing party is the most voted and the second and third most voted parties are allied left-wing parties who can form a combined majority. A model where elections both aggregate information and discipline incumbents can rationalize our results and yields additional predictions we take to the data, such as voters punishing second most voted parties that appoint mayors.