老练选民参与的序贯公投

中文摘要

本文将 Romer-Rosenthal 议程设定模型扩展至一个包含老练选民且选民偏好存在不确定性的两期框架。如果议程设定者的首次提案被否决，就会提出第二次提案。老练选民在回应首次提案时会预期第二次提案，议程设定者在提出首次提案时也会考虑选民的这种前瞻性。我们比较了议程设定者在两期面对相同选民和面对不同选民时的结果，并将这两种结果分别与天真选民情形下的相应结果进行比较。对于某些选民偏好分布，选民的前瞻性消除了议程设定者因拥有两次提案机会而获得的收益；对于另一些分布，议程设定者则可以利用选民的前瞻性，取得比选民天真时更好的结果。无论选民是老练还是天真，议程设定者拥有两次提案机会时的结果总是不劣于只有一次机会时，但并非总是更好。此外，由于议程设定者与选民的偏好并非直接对立，当议程设定者拥有两次而非一次提案机会时，选民也可能获得更好的结果。

Abstract

This paper extends the Romer-Rosenthal agenda setting model to a two-period setting with sophisticated Voters and uncertainty about Voter preferences. If the Setter’s first proposal is rejected, the Setter will make a second proposal. Sophisticated Voters will anticipate the second proposal in responding to the first proposal. The Setter takes their sophistication into account in making the first proposal. We compare outcomes when the Setter faces the same Voters in the two periods with outcomes when the Setter faces different Voters in the two periods, and compare both with the corresponding outcomes with naïve Voters. For some distributions of Voter preferences, Voter sophistication eliminates the benefit to the Setter from having two opportunities; for others, the Setter can exploit the sophistication of Voters to do even better than when Voters are naïve. Whether Voters are sophisticated or naïve, the Setter always does at least as well with two opportunities than with one, but does not always do better. Moreover, because the preferences of the Setter and of the Voters are not directly opposed, the Voters may also do better when the Setter has two opportunities rather than one.