中文摘要
本文构建了一个包含两级政府的动态无限期界模型，从理论和定量两方面研究财政分权如何影响地方政府与中央政府的债务积累和支出。在模型中，中央政府向地方政府进行转移支付，以抵消纵向与横向财政失衡。但对转移支付的预期降低了地方政府的预期借款成本，并在事前导致过度借款。在缺乏承诺的情况下，中央政府过度转移支付以减少地方政府未来的借款需求，在均衡中，地方与中央债务均无效率地偏高。与经验证据一致，当财政分权扩大纵向财政失衡时，地方政府更加依赖转移支付，且地方与中央债务均上升。应用于西班牙，该模型解释了1988–1996年间纵向财政失衡扩大时政府总债务上升的39%，以及1996–2006年间失衡缩小时债务下降的18%。
Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic infinite-horizon model with two layers of governments to study theoretically and quantitatively how fiscal decentralization affects local and central government debt accumulation and spending. In the model, the central government makes transfers to local governments to offset vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances. But the anticipation of transfers lowers local governments’ expected cost of borrowing and leads to overborrowing ex ante. Absent commitment, the central government over-transfers to reduce local governments’ future need to borrow, and in the equilibrium both local and central debts are inefficiently high. Consistent with empirical evidence, when fiscal decentralization widens vertical fiscal imbalances, local governments become more reliant on transfers, and both local and central debts rise. Applied to Spain, the model explains 39 percent of the rise in total government debt when the vertical fiscal imbalances widened during 1988–1996, and 18 percent of the fall in debt when the imbalances narrowed during 1996–2006.