Journal of Public Economics · 2022 · Zach Raff、Andrew G. Meyer、Jason M. Walter
中文摘要
本文研究地方政治如何影响一项关键联邦环境政策——《清洁空气法》在发电部门的州级实施。分析聚焦于在违反联邦空气质量标准、受到严格监管的“未达标”区域中，资本密集型空气污染减排技术的安装。主要研究设计采用了共和党州长得票率的断点回归以及对势均力敌选举的事件研究分析。在未达标区域，相对于达标区域以及民主党州长控制的反事实情形，共和党州长控制使得新的空气污染减排资本支出差异化地减少了90%，并使安装最有效氮氧化物减排技术的概率降低了九个百分点。在未达标区域，氮氧化物排放减少带来的健康收益很可能超过电力公司新增空气污染减排技术的额外成本。然而，估计的收益成本比小于许多其他空气污染减排政策，且对于运行时间少于五年的技术，其净收益可能为负。
Abstract
In this paper, we study how local politics affect state level implementation of a critical federal environmental policy, the Clean Air Act, in the electricity generation sector. The analysis focuses on the installation of capital intensive air pollution abatement technology in highly regulated “nonattainment” areas, which violate federal air quality standards. The primary research design uses a regression discontinuity in the vote share for Republican governors and event study analyses of close elections. In nonattainment areas, Republican gubernatorial control differentially decreases new air pollution abatement capital spending by 90% and the probability of installing the most effective nitrogen oxide abatement technology by nine percentage points, relative to attainment areas and the counterfactual of Democratic gubernatorial control. The health benefits from reduced nitrogen oxide emissions in nonattainment areas likely exceed the additional costs of new air pollution abatement technology at electric utilities. However, the estimated benefit-cost ratios are smaller than those from many other air pollution abatement policies and net benefits may be negative for technology that will operate for fewer than five years.