Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
American Economic Review · 2022 · Pablo Balán、Augustin Bergeron、Gabriel Tourek、Jonathan Weigel
中文摘要
本文考察了低能力国家中地方精英与国家代理人作为税收征收者之间的权衡。我们研究了一项随机政策实验，将一个刚果大城市的社区分配给城市首领或国家代理人进行财产税征收。首领征收使税收遵从提高了3.2个百分点，使收入增加了44%。首领收取了更多贿赂，但并未削弱税收道德或对政府的信任。来自一个混合处理组的结果（在该处理组中，国家代理人在征收前与首领协商）表明，首领征收者之所以实现更高的遵从，是因为利用地方信息更高效地瞄准了具有高支付倾向的家庭，而非在已走访家庭的条件下更有效地说服其缴纳税款。(JEL D73, D83, H24, H26, H71, O12, O17)
Abstract
This paper investigates the trade-offs between local elites and state agents as tax collectors in low-capacity states. We study a randomized policy experiment assigning neighborhoods of a large Congolese city to property tax collection by city chiefs or state agents. Chief collection raised tax compliance by 3.2 percentage points, increasing revenue by 44 percent. Chiefs collected more bribes but did not undermine tax morale or trust in government. Results from a hybrid treatment arm in which state agents consulted with chiefs before collection suggest that chief collectors achieved higher compliance by using local information to more efficiently target households with high payment propensities, rather than by being more effective at persuading households to pay conditional on having visited them. (JEL D73, D83, H24, H26, H71, O12, O17)