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法院执行、银行贷款与企业投资:来自巴西破产改革的证据

Court Enforcement, Bank Loans, and Firm Investment: Evidence from a Bankruptcy Reform in Brazil *
Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2016 · Jacopo Ponticelli、Leonardo Soriano de Alencar

中文摘要

我们利用巴西各市镇民事法院案件积压程度的差异,结合一项加强有担保债权人保护的破产改革,估计法院执行对企业融资可得性、投资和规模的影响。我们发现,在法院案件积压较少的市镇经营的企业,在改革后的数年中,有担保贷款使用的增幅更大,投资和产出价值的增幅也更大。为确定因果关系的方向,我们采用工具变量策略,利用巴西各州关于司法组织的法律,重点考察同一州内位于司法辖区边界两侧、其他方面相似的相邻市镇之间法院案件积压程度的差异。证据表明,法院执行的差异会影响金融改革对企业融资可得性、投资和规模的作用。

Abstract

Abstract We exploit variation in the congestion of civil courts across Brazilian municipalities, together with a bankruptcy reform increasing secured creditors’ protection, to estimate the effect of enforcement on firm access to finance, investment, and size. We find that firms operating in municipalities with less congested courts experienced a larger increase in the use of secured loans, as well as a larger increase in investment and value of output in the years after the reform. To establish the direction of causality, we use an instrumental variable strategy that exploits Brazilian state laws on judicial organization, and focus on differences in court congestion across otherwise similar neighboring municipalities located across judicial district borders within the same state. The evidence indicates that differences in court enforcement affect the impact of financial reform on firm access to finance, investment, and size.
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