Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment, and Vertical Integration
American Economic Review · 2022 · Simon Loertscher、Leslie M. Marx
中文摘要
我们提供了一个不完全信息议价框架，用以刻画在具有多个买方和多个供应商的市场中差异化议价能力的效应。市场被建模为一个最大化企业期望加权福利的机制，并受激励相容、个体理性以及无赤字约束。我们表明，在该模型中，认为纵向一体化会增加等权社会剩余的推测并无依据，而适当地改变议价权重的横向并购则可能增加社会剩余。此外，有效议价意味着在均衡中不可缔约投资是有效的。(JEL C78, D82, D83, G34, K21, L22, L40)
Abstract
We provide an incomplete information bargaining framework that captures the effects of differential bargaining power in markets with multiple buyers and multiple suppliers. The market is modeled as a mechanism that maximizes the expected weighted welfare of the firms, subject to the constraints of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and no deficit. We show that, in this model, there is no basis for the presumption that vertical integration increases equally weighted social surplus, while it is possible that horizontal mergers that appropriately change bargaining weights increase social surplus. Moreover, efficient bargaining implies that in equilibrium noncontractible investments are efficient. (JEL C78, D82, D83, G34, K21, L22, L40)