American Economic Review · 2022 · Felix Bierbrauer、Aleh Tsyvinski、Nicolas Werquin
中文摘要
我们构建了一个包含内生投票率与内生政纲的政治竞争模型。政党在激励其支持者投票与抑制竞争政党支持者投票之间进行权衡。我们证明，对于在政治竞选中占据优势的政党而言，后一目标尤为突出。因此，某政党政治支持的增加可能导致其采取有利于对手的政策，从而不对称地去动员对手的支持者。我们研究了这对再分配税收政治经济学的含义。均衡税收政策通常与被去动员的选民的利益相一致。(JEL D63, D72, H23, H24)
Abstract
We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized. (JEL D63, D72, H23, H24)