The effects of public campaign funding: Evidence from Seattle’s Democracy Voucher program
中文摘要
在每个选举周期，西雅图市向每位登记选民发放四张25美元的代金券，这些代金券可捐赠给竞选市公职的竞选团队并由其兑换。通过双重差分研究设计，我们研究了西雅图该计划在实施后前两个周期内对市议会选举多项结果的因果效应，比较城市取自华盛顿州和加利福尼亚州的大城市。我们发现总捐款增加了53%，独立捐款人数量增加了350%；这些效应在很大程度上可由小额捐款（定义为低于200美元的捐款）的大幅增加来解释。我们发现私人捐款减少的证据在统计上不显著，尽管我们的点估计表明存在中等至较大程度的挤出比率。我们进一步估计候选人数量极显著地增加了86%，同时在任者选举成功率大幅下降。这些结果提供了关于去中心化公共竞选融资方案效应的首批因果证据之一，同时也更一般地揭示了竞选监管对捐款活动、候选人进入和在任者优势的影响。
Abstract
During each election cycle, the city of Seattle distributes four $25 vouchers to every registered voter, which may be donated to and redeemed by campaigns for city office. Through a difference-in-differences research design, we study the causal effect of Seattle’s program on various outcomes in city council elections in the first two cycles after implementation, with comparison cities drawn from large cities in Washington and California. We find a 53% increase in total contributions and a 350% increase in number of unique donors; these effects are largely explained by large increases in small donations, defined as contributions less than $200. We find statistically insignificant evidence of decreases in private donations, although our point estimates suggest moderate-to-substantial crowd-out ratios. We further estimate a highly significant 86% increase in number of candidates coupled with substantial decreases in incumbent electoral success. These results provide some of the first causal evidence of the effect of decentralized public campaign finance schemes, while speaking to the impacts of campaign regulation more generally on donation activity, candidate entry, and incumbency advantage.