American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2022 · Katherine R. H. Wagner
中文摘要
本文量化了投保过程中的摩擦，检验了逆向选择，并分析了自然灾害保险市场中拟议改革的福利效应。我发现支付意愿极低。在高风险洪泛区，即使保费仅占自身成本的三分之二，购买洪水保险的房主也不到60%。利用近期美国国会改革带来的房屋层面保费变异估计洪水保险的需求弹性和成本弹性，结果表明这些房主基于适应性的可观测差异选择投保，而非基于关于风险的私人信息。这些发现改变了拟议政策预测福利效应的符号。（JEL D82, G22, Q54）
Abstract
This paper quantifies frictions in uptake, tests for adverse selection, and analyzes welfare effects of proposed reforms in natural disaster insurance markets. I find that willingness to pay is remarkably low. In high-risk flood zones, fewer than 60 percent of homeowners purchase flood insurance even though premiums are only two-thirds of own costs. Estimating flood insurance demand and cost elasticities using house-level variation in premiums from recent US congressional reforms reveals that these homeowners select into insurance based on observable differences in adaptation but not private information about risk. These findings change the sign of predicted welfare effects of proposed policies. (JEL D82, G22, Q54)