American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2022 · Emeric Henry、Ekaterina V. Zhuravskaya、Sergei M. Guriev
中文摘要
在2019年欧洲议会选举竞选期间，我们向法国达到投票年龄的Facebook用户的随机样本展示了一个极右翼民粹主义政党的虚假陈述。一个随机选择的子组还被展示了对这些陈述的事实核查；另一个子组则被提供是否查看事实核查的选择。参与者随后可以在其Facebook主页上分享这些陈述。我们表明：(i)强制性和自愿性的事实核查均使虚假陈述的分享减少约45%，(ii)强制性与自愿性事实核查的效应大小相近，(iii)分享虚假陈述所需的每一次额外点击均大幅减少了分享。（JEL D72, D81, D91）
Abstract
During the 2019 European elections campaign, we exposed a random sample of French voting-age Facebook users to false statements by a far-right populist party. A randomly selected subgroup was also presented with fact-checking of these statements; another subgroup was offered a choice of whether to view the fact-checking. Participants could then share these statements on their Facebook pages. We show that (i) both imposed and voluntary fact-checking reduce sharing of false statements by about 45 percent, (ii) the size of the effect is similar between imposed and voluntary fact-checking, and (iii) each additional click required to share false statements sub stantially reduces sharing. (JEL D72, D81, D91)