American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2022 · Eric Glen Weyl、Anthony Lee Zhang
中文摘要
许多政府通过拍卖或其他类市场机制分配自然资源的使用许可证，如无线电频谱、捕捞权和矿物开采权。许可证设计会影响资源使用者的投资激励以及资产配置的效率。现存的许可证设计均无法在这两个维度上实现最优结果。长期许可证赋予所有者高投资激励，但阻碍了向高价值新进入者的再配置。短期许可证提高了配置效率，但抑制了投资。我们提出了一种简单的新机制，即折耗许可证，并论证了它比现存的许可证设计更有效地化解了这一权衡。(JEL D44, D45, H82, K11, Q28, Q38, Q58)
Abstract
Many governments assign use licenses for natural resources, such as radio spectrum, fishing rights, and mineral extraction rights, through auctions or other market-like mechanisms. License design affects resource users’ investment incentives as well as the efficiency of asset allocation. No existing license design achieves first-best outcomes on both dimensions. Long-term licenses give owners high investment incentives but impede reallocation to high-valued entrants. Short-term licenses improve allocative efficiency but discourage investment. We propose a simple new mechanism, the depreciating license, and we argue that it navigates this trade-off more effectively than existing license designs. (JEL D44, D45, H82, K11, Q28, Q38, Q58)