中文摘要
本文研究了公共部门养老金义务，这是当前许多美国城市面临的最大财政挑战。采用围绕势均力敌选举的断点回归设计，研究表明在民主党市长治下，城市公共部门养老金的福利支出增长更快，而对养老金的缴费并未如此。先前的研究表明，政党对于城市的众多财政支出并不重要，并用选民施加财政纪律来解释这一现象。本文复现了先前的结果，但表明政党对于选民不关注的隐蔽支出类型确实可以产生影响，特别是当这些支出能使组织良好的利益集团受益时。(JEL D72, H72, H75, J32, J45)
Abstract
This paper studies public sector pension obligations, the biggest fiscal challenge currently facing many US cities. Employing a regression discontinuity design around close elections, benefit payments out of a city’s public sector pensions are shown to grow faster under Democratic party mayors, while contributions into the pensions do not. Previous research showed that parties do not matter for a wide range of cities’ fiscal expenditures and explained this with voters imposing fiscal discipline. This paper replicates previous results but shows that parties can matter for shrouded expenditure types that voters do not pay attention to, especially if they benefit well-organized interest groups. (JEL D72, H72, H75, J32, J45)