American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2026 · Kyle J. Myers、Wei Yang Tham
中文摘要
我们通过调查实验检验科研资助的设计——即授予的资金与时间——如何被用于管理研究人员。平均而言，研究人员在选择资助时相对不愿意以资金换取时间。然而，研究人员的偏好存在显著的异质性。在获得资助的条件下，不同的设计仅对研究人员关于如何使用资金的计划产生微小改变。资助设计的边际变化对选择效应（资助方吸引特定研究人员的能力）的影响比对处理效应（资助方改变研究人员策略的能力）更为相关。（JEL C83, I23, O31）
Abstract
We conduct survey experiments to test how the design of scientific grants—the money and time awarded—can be used to manage researchers. On average, researchers are relatively unwilling to trade off money for time when choosing among grants. However, there is significant heterogeneity in researchers' preferences. Conditional on receiving a grant, different designs cause only minor changes in researchers' plans for how they would use the funding. Marginal changes in grant design are more relevant for selection effects (funders' ability to attract certain researchers) than treatment effects (funders' ability to change researchers' strategies). (JEL C83, I23, O31)