冗员劳动力？取消大龄劳动者就业保护的影响

中文摘要

我们分析了瑞典的强制退休制度，该制度在67岁时取消了就业保护。在67岁时，就业立即下降约10%，总平均收入立即下降约20%。8%的工作因失去保护而立即分离，其效应源于初始就业保护较强（长任期、受“后进先出”规则约束的企业）的工作，以及公共部门的工作。我们考察了对继续留存工作的影响。虽然工资显得刚性，我们发现了新的、规模可观的集约边际工时减少，导致在留任工作的条件下收入下降8%。

Abstract

We analyze mandatory retirement in Sweden, which eliminates employment protection at age 67. Employment falls by about 10 percent and total average earnings by about 20 percent immediately at age 67. Eight percent of jobs separate immediately due to loss of protection, with effects stemming from jobs with stronger initial employment protection (long tenure, firms subject to “last in, first out” rules), and those in the public sector. We examine the effects on continuing jobs. While wages appear rigid, we uncover novel, sizable intensive-margin hours reductions, resulting in an 8 percent drop in earnings conditional on staying on the job. (JEL J14, J22, J26, J31, J63, K31)