American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2026 · Bruno Baránek、Leon Musolff、Vítězslav Titl
中文摘要
我们开发了一种在多阶段拍卖中检测卡特尔的方法。该方法允许企业在面对卡特尔成员时采取串通行为，而在其他情况下则进行竞争。在这种拍卖中，投标者提交初始报价，并可以在之后下调报价。由于初始报价会策略性地偏离成本，相近的初始报价表明成本相似，从而形成以低于对手的价格报价的强烈动机。我们将那些相对于其他具有相近初始报价的企业对而言，无视这一激励、未针对彼此调整各自报价的企业对归类为串通企业对。我们的算法预测了乌克兰反垄断委员会的制裁：被分类为串通的企业对受到制裁的可能性是其他企业对的九倍。（JEL D22, D44, H57, K21, L12, P31, P35）
Abstract
We develop a method for detecting cartels in multistage auctions. Our approach allows firms to act collusively against cartel members yet competitively otherwise. In these auctions, bidders submit initial bids and can later revise them downward. As initial bids are shaded, close initial bids indicate similar costs and thus create strong incentives to undercut rivals. We classify firm pairs as collusive if they ignore this incentive by failing to update bids against each other, relative to other pairs with similarly close initial bids. Our algorithm predicts Ukraine's Antimonopoly Committee sanctions: Classified pairs are nine times more likely to be sanctioned. (JEL D22, D44, H57, K21, L12, P31, P35)