中文摘要
劳动流动限制的支持者认为，创新激励足以抵消对劳动者的损害。然而，此类政策对创新的因果效应仍是一个有待实证检验的开放性问题。利用州层面竞业禁止协议（NCAs）可执行性的看似外生变化，我们发现其对创新具有显著的负向效应。这一效应对最具新颖性和创新性的专利与企业而言更为突出。进一步分析表明，这些对创新的负向效应无法仅由市场进入来解释，而很可能源于知识流动的减少。我们的发现表明，劳动流动在知识跨企业传播中发挥着关键作用。(JEL E24, J08, J21, K31, O31, O33)
Abstract
Proponents of labor mobility restrictions argue that innovation incentives more than offset harm to workers. Yet the causal effect of such policies on innovation is an open empirical question. Leveraging plausibly exogenous state-level changes in the enforceability of noncompete agreements (NCAs), we find a significant negative effect on innovation. This effect is even larger for the most novel and innovative patents and firms. Further analysis shows these negative effects on innovation cannot be explained by entry alone and instead likely result from reduced knowledge flows. Our findings suggest that labor mobility plays a crucial role in spreading knowledge across firms. (JEL E24, J08, J21, K31, O31, O33)