American Economic Review · 2021 · Luigi Butera、Robert Metcalfe、William G. Morrison、Dmitry Taubinsky
中文摘要
公开表彰常被用于激励合意行为，然而其福利效应——诸如羞耻成本或自豪收益——却鲜有测量。我们开发了一种可移植的实证方法，用于测量社会形象效用并将其货币化，并在关于锻炼和慈善行为的实验中应用了该方法。在所有实验中，公开表彰均能激励合意行为，但会产生高度不平等的形象收益。高表现个体获得显著的效用收益，而低表现个体遭受显著的效用损失。我们估计了社会信号传递的结构模型，并利用该模型探讨了公开表彰政策的社会效率。 (JEL C93, D64, D82, D91)
Abstract
Public recognition is frequently used to motivate desirable behavior, yet its welfare effects—such as costs of shame or gains from pride— are rarely measured. We develop a portable empirical methodology for measuring and monetizing social image utility, and we deploy it in experiments on exercise and charitable behavior. In all experiments, public recognition motivates desirable behavior but creates highly unequal image payoffs. High-performing individuals enjoy significant utility gains, while low-performing individuals incur significant utility losses. We estimate structural models of social signaling, and we use the models to explore the social efficiency of public recognition policies. (JEL C93, D64, D82, D91)