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欧盟的主权债务与财政一体化

Sovereign Debt and Fiscal Integration in the European Union
Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2025 · [{"name": "Ζsolt Darvas", "affiliation": ["Corvinus University of Budapest"]}, {"name": "Lennard Welslau", "affiliation": ["Danmarks Nationalbank"]}, {"name": "Jeromin Zettelmeyer", "affiliation": ["Bruegel"]}]

中文摘要

本文考察欧洲联盟的主权债务风险。欧盟已在欧元区内实行统一(集中化)的货币政策,而财政政策仍由各国自主决定。共同银行监管、欧洲稳定机制、欧洲央行的市场稳定工具以及一套新的财政规则等制度改革,已缓解了银行与主权国家之间相互依存所引发的脆弱性。随机债务可持续性分析表明,尽管部分国家需要进行大幅财政调整,但多数欧盟国家的债务仍具可持续性。然而,财政反应函数估计显示,政策对债务上升的反应正在减弱,预示中期风险有所上升。本文认为,需要进一步调整财政规则,以鼓励投资,并为低风险国家提供更大的灵活性。扩大欧盟共同安全资产池,也有助于打破银行—主权国家的恶性循环、吸引外国投资者并增强财政可持续性。

Abstract

This paper examines sovereign debt risks in the European Union, which has centralized monetary policy within the euro area, while fiscal policies remain national. Institutional reforms, including common banking supervision, the European Stability Mechanism, the European Central Bank’s market-stabilisation instruments, and a new set of fiscal rules, have mitigated vulnerabilities arising from the interdependence between banks and sovereigns. Stochastic debt sustainability analysis suggests that debt remains sustainable in most EU countries, although substantial fiscal adjustments will be required in some cases. Fiscal reaction function estimates, however, reveal a weakening policy response to rising debt, signalling increased medium-term risks. The paper argues that further adaptation of fiscal rules is needed to encourage investment and provide greater flexibility for low-risk countries. Expanding the pool of common EU safe assets could also help break the bank-sovereign doom-loop, attract foreign investors, and strengthen fiscal sustainability.
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