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为何监管垃圾费用

Why Regulate Junk Fees?
Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2025 · [{"name": "Neale Mahoney", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research"]}]

中文摘要

本文考察垃圾费用日益普遍的现象, 包括强制性的后端费用与隐藏的附加收费, 这些费用掩盖了商品和服务的真实成本。本文借助活动门票、酒店、有线电视账单、餐馆和金融服务等例子, 说明这些定价做法如何提高搜寻成本与均衡价格、扭曲消费者选择, 并将创新引向剥削性而非提升价值的策略。经济理论与证据表明, 仅靠竞争和信息披露往往不足以约束垃圾费用。本文回顾了近期的监管回应, 包括要求前端一次性全包定价的联邦与州级规则, 并讨论其对消费者福利与市场效率的影响。垃圾费用政策的快速演变, 为经济学家研究其预期与非预期后果提供了丰富机会。归根结底, 监管垃圾费用的理由并非基于家长主义, 而是为了增进市场运行。

Abstract

This essay examines the growing prevalence of junk fees, including mandatory back-end fees and hidden add-on charges, which obscure the true cost of goods and services. Drawing on examples from event tickets, hotels, cable bills, restaurants, and financial services, I show how these pricing practices increase search costs and equilibrium prices, distort consumer choices, and divert innovation toward exploitative rather than value-enhancing strategies. Economic theory and evidence suggest that competition and disclosure alone are often insufficient to discipline junk fees. I review recent regulatory responses, including federal and state rules that require all-in-one upfront pricing, and discuss their implications for consumer welfare and market efficiency. The rapid evolution of junk fee policies provides economists with rich opportunities to study their intended and unintended consequences. At its core, the case for regulating junk fees rests not on paternalism but on enhancing market functioning.
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